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Abstract 
 
Theories of dehumanization  generally assume a single clear-cut,  value-free  and non- 
dilemmatic boundary between the categories ‘human’ and ‘animal’. The present study highlights 
the relevance of dilemmas involved in drawing that boundary. In six focus groups carried out in 
Romania and Britain, 42 participants were challenged to think about dilemmas pertaining to animal 
and human life. Four themes were identified:  rational autonomy, sentience, speciesism and 
maintaining  materialist  and post-materialist  values. Sentience made animals resemble humans, 
while humans’ rational autonomy made them distinctive.  Speciesism underlay  the human 
participants’  prioritization of their own interests over those of animals, and a conservative  
consensus that the existing social system could not change supported  this speciesism when it was 
challenged. Romanian participants  appealed to Romania’s lack of modernity and British 
participants to Britain’s modernity to justify such conservatism. The findings suggest that the 
human–animal boundary  is not essentialized; rather it seems that such boundary is constructed  
in a dilemmatic and post hoc way. Implications  for theories of dehumanization are discussed. 
 
 
In 2003,  a Hungarian  judge decided that two men wrongly accused of murder should receive 
less compensation than they had demanded in  their  wrongful-arrest  suit. The judge argued that 
the two Gypsy men had ‘more primitive personalities than the average; therefore, the 
psychological  damage they suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation 
they requested’ (Transitions On Line, 18–24 November 2003). Cases  like  this illustrate 
dehumanization,  the process whereby out-group members are discriminated  against by being 
associated with more animal-like attributes, or are perceived  as being less than human. The 
present research is concerned with the ways that humans configure animal nature so that it comes 
to support such justifications of discrimination against out-group members. 
 
In recent research on intergroup relations, dehumanization has been operationalized in  the  
infrahumanization  and ontologization  paradigms. The infrahumanization paradigm holds that 
groups are motivated to reserve the human essence to the in-group and to deny it to out-groups. 
This resembles the formulation of pseudospeciation, which holds that group members harbour the 
false belief that their group has a unique and superior human identity (Erikson, 1970, 1985). 
Infrahumanization research relies on the distinction between primary  emotions, which are 
assumed to be common to animals and humans (e.g. fear), and secondary emotions, which are 
assumed to be uniquely human (e.g. nostalgia).  In  several studies, it  has been found that while  
primary emotions are equally attributed to out-group and in-group, out-group  members are 
generally attributed fewer secondary emotions than in-group members (Leyens et al., 2000; 
Leyens et al., 2001). This differential attribution of secondary emotions to in- group and out-
groups is considered to represent the perception of out-group members as less-than-human,  and 
less human  than the in-group, given their presumed inability to feel uniquely human emotions. 
Infrahumanization  researchers further assume that by denying out-groups these essentially 
human emotions, dehumanizing treatment is justified (Leyens  et al., 2003; Leyens,  De´sert,  
Croizet, &  Darcis, 2002). While the infrahumanization paradigm makes use of the animal–
human binary, it does not assume that in-groups associate out-group members with animals, but 
rather that they perceive out-group members  as being less-than-human. 
  
 
The other strand of research on dehumanization, the ontologization  paradigm, has focused 
particularly on the dehumanization and social exclusion of the Gypsy minority. It has similarly used 
the animal–human binary, but it has operationalized dehumanization in terms of traits rather than 
emotions. This approach  uses the distinction between animal (or natural) and human (or cultural) 
attributes, where animal attributes are common to animals and humans, e.g. dirty,  whereas human 
attributes  are uniquely human, e.g. creative.  Experimental  research  has shown that  members of 
the Gypsy minority are attributed more animal-like than human-like traits (Chulvi & Pe´rez, 2003; 
Chulvi & Pe´rez, 2005; Pe´rez, Chulvi, & Alonso, 2001; Pe´rez, Moscovici, & Chulvi, 2002) and less 
human-like traits than members of the in-group (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). The ontologization 
paradigm takes  a historical approach and argues that  the majority creates  a different ontology for 
those minority groups which have resisted cultural assimilation for centuries in order to explain their 
resistance. Social groups which fail to be culturally assimilated, such as the Gypsies, are presumed to 
have a different human nature from that of the majority, which rationalizes their assumed inability 
to become civilized and thus fully human. 
 
The empirical research programs of infrahumanization and ontologization bear a family 
resemblance to more theoretical perspectives within social psychology on the legitimization of 
discrimination. Bar-Tal (1989, 1990) suggests that dehumanization is a form of delegitimization  
which serves to exclude certain groups from the realm of acceptable norms and values and to 
legitimize their inhumane treatment. Relatedly, dehumanization is seen as a form of moral 
exclusion, i.e. placing individuals or groups ‘outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and 
considerations of fairness apply.  Those who  are morally  excluded are perceived as   
nonentities, expendable, or undeserving’ (Opotow, 1990:1). In other words, several theories 
assume that treating an out-group as ‘less-than-human’  can be both a precursor and a justification 
of negative actions towards members of that group. 
 
Despite their  shared reliance on the animal–human binary, ontologization and 
infrahumanization theories differ in two key aspects. First, ontologization researchers are more 
explicit about the historical basis of their findings. They argue that those particular  social 
groups who  do  not  adopt assimilationist cultural  strategies are presumed to have a different 
ontological essence that explains their resistance to the majority culture’s efforts to assimilate 
them. In contrast, infrahumanization researchers argue that conflict  is not  a  necessary  
precondition  for  infrahumanization, as  this phenomenon relates more to in-group favouritism. 
Indeed, some research has shown that ontologization can go beyond failed assimilation and be 
applied to other discriminated out-groups, such as  black Africans (Deschamps, Vala, Marinho, 
Costa Lopes, &  Cabecinhas,  2005). Second, the ontologization paradigm attends to  the 
attribution of traits, whereas the infrahumanization research attends to the attribution of emotions. 
These two different operationalizations may tap into different representations of humanness, and 
so far it remains unclear whether the two measures yield converging results; some research has 
found that they converge in some countries but not in others (Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005). 
 
Traits have also been used to measure the attribution of humanness to self and others (Haslam, 
Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). Haslam et al did not employ a human– animal binary; 
participants rated personality traits from  the Five-Factor  Model on continuous scales of human 
typicality and human uniqueness. Haslam et al found that only human typicality is understood in 
an essentialist manner, and raised the debate of whether dehumanization involves representations 
of human nature or of what is uniquely human (e.g. secondary emotions). While this particular 
debate is beyond the scope of this paper, it is noteworthy that dehumanization  research lacks a 
consensus on what the human essence  is and how  it  should be investigated. 
  
Infrahumanization researchers, for example, chose to focus on the attribution of human emotions 
for ease of operationalization and because other aspects of humanness such as intelligence or 
language  had  already been studied (see Crocker, Major, &  Steele, 1998; Giles & Coupland, 
1991). Relatedly, it is not the case that animals are the only ‘other’ to the category of humans; 
people could also be dehumanized by comparing them to machines (Haslam, 2006). 
 
Yet, few theorists and experimentalists have reflected on how the human–animal boundary is 
drawn or why it might serve  as such a robust resource for delegitimizing out-groups  (see Plous, 
2003). Infrahumanization  research has recently focused on the problems associated with a strict 
dichotomy between human and animal emotions and has suggested  that emotions be located 
along a  single continuum of humanness (see Demoulin et al., 2004). However, the distinction 
between humans and animals, whether understood as categorical  or continuous, is implied to be 
both consensual and unaffected by ideological factors. 
 
In  contrast, the present research explored the human–animal  boundary as an ideological 
construction that can be made up and contested in dialogue. How might the construction of human–
animal differences be understood as ideological work? As Garner (2003) points out, ideological 
discourse is dominated by anthropocentrism that reflects humans’ power and domination over 
animals. Philosophers such as Ryder (1971) and Singer (1990) call this anthropocentric ideology 
speciesism and describe it as a lived ideology, suggesting that it may contain contrary 
propositions (see Billig et al., 1988). Indeed, animals are sometimes anthropomorphized as  
being like humans and sometimes  dehumanized  as being unlike humans  (see Opotow, 1993). 
Humans may dehumanize the animals they eat, while simultaneously anthropomorphizing  the pets 
to which they feed the scraps of those animals from the dinner tables. By so doing, humans shore 
up their interests in protein-rich food and inter-species  companionship, respectively. Like any 
ideology, speciesism comprises ‘a well-systematised  set of categories which provide a “frame” 
for the belief, perception and conduct of a body of individuals’ (Eagleton, 1991: 43). In this case, 
the body of individuals whose actions are so framed is ‘humans’ themselves. 
 
Humans, animals and speciesism 
 
Examining humans’ position of power over animals is important for the dehumanization paradigm 
because,  as Plous  (2003) remarks, ‘the very act of “treating humans like animals” would lose 
its meaning if animals were treated well’ (2003; 510). If animals are usually excluded from the 
scope of justice, the question naturally arises as to what allows humans, but not animals, to enjoy 
rights. The philosopher Tom Regan (1997) has highlighted that human rights rest on both 
cognitive and non-cognitive criteria, which could be extended to animals, but typically are not. 
The first of these is rational autonomy.  Indeed, the first article of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) states that ‘all human beings : : : are endowed with reason and 
conscience’. Yet, as Regan (1997) notes, such human rights are given to humans who are not 
rational autonomous agents (such as  infants or severely mentally disabled people) but are 
refused to certain rational animals (such as some primates). The non-cognitive criterion holds that 
humans are sentient beings, i.e. capable of feeling pain and pleasure, and that rights therefore 
should be granted to them in order to protect them from suffering. As the article 5 of the UDHR 
stipulates, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. Animals, obviously, do not enjoy such rights, and Regan argues that it is humans’ 
anthropocentric attitudes rather than any a priori differences between humans and other animals 
that determine the current denial of rights to animals which have the capacity for sentience.  As 
Malik insightfully points out, ‘there is no line on the map that allows us to define the boundary 
between Man (sic) and Beast. We have to draw that line ourselves, according to our needs and 
  
perspectives’ (2000; 205). Leaving aside the issues of rational autonomy and sentience, Singer 
(1990) posits a  different reason to extend rights to animals: ‘the moral principle of equal 
consideration of interests’ (p. 237), where interests represent any being’s desire to stay alive and to 
be free from pain, for ‘if a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that 
suffering into consideration’ (p. 8). For Singer, it is speciesist to believe that human life is 
sacrosanct and that only humans are morally entitled to rights and protection from harm and 
suffering. 
 
Like other ideologies that justify hierarchy and exploitation, speciesism is arguably accompanied 
by representations of what one might call false consciousness in animals, i.e. an internalization of 
their inferiority. Studies of ‘false consciousness’ run aground when they posit some kind of 
‘truth’  against which the consciousness of a group is measured and found to be wanting (see 
Billig, 1999; Eagleton, 1991; Jost, 1995, for discussion). It would be particularly difficult to 
know how human theories of ‘false consciousness’ might apply to animal cognitions. However, 
as Singer (1990) and Plous (2003) point out, humans often portray animals  as enjoying their 
exploitation, and farm animals depicted in mass media  as working happily for the benefit of 
humans are not difficult to locate. Food packaging such as the Laughing Cow masks the 
exploitation and pain that comes with intensive farming. Also, note how writers on National Hunt 
horse racing in the UK routinely balance coverage of equine fatalities in races with claims  
about steeplechasing  being within  thoroughbreds’ nature and a  source of satisfaction to them 
(e.g. see Montgomery, 2006). Such representations may function as a form of system 
justification  (Jost & Banaji, 1994) that legitimates existing unequal social arrangements. Also, 
as Haraway   (1989) notes, we are conditioned to look at animals  as mirrors of our nature, often 
with disregard for the welfare of the animals that we make do our metaphorical work for us. 
Indeed, Orwell’s Animal Farm, arguably the best example of a literary discussion of false 
consciousness  among animals, gains its force as an analogy of false consciousness among 
humans. 
 
Cultural and post-materialist values 
 
So far, we have described humans’ speciesism as homogenous, but cultural values may also shape the 
ways that animals are imagined to be. There are obvious differences between and within human 
cultures with regard to the way animals are perceived. For example, cows are viewed as holy in 
Hindu culture but pigs are seen as unclean  in Muslim and Jewish cultures. Some religions, such as 
Jainism and Buddhism, prescribe vegetarianism for all. However, in Christian and secular societies, 
vegetarianism represents a personal choice. Some societies have even tentatively extended the 
concept of ‘rights’ to animals. 
 
Growth in concern about animal rights has been understood as a particularity of 
‘post-materialist’ capitalist societies (Franklin, Tranter, & White, 2001). Inglehart (1977, 
1990, 1997) holds that value orientations in advanced industrial societies change in response to 
increased existential security. As people become liberated from immediate material worries, they 
dedicate more time to thinking about social groups who had historically experienced 
discrimination (such as disabled  people, women and ethnic minorities), environmental politics 
and animal welfare. In extending rights to animals, post-materialist values seem to help in 
breaking the dichotomy of culture–nature and in achieving a  hybridization of the two in what 
Latour (1993) would call ‘a work of translation’. In Britain, this project took institutional form 
in 1824 when the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded, the first ever 
animal welfare society in any country. Yet, Latour also notes that modern societies tend to 
ignore such hybridization and continue to construct ‘people’ and ‘things’ as ontologically 
  
different, with animals being one of several funny zones in between that modern subjects prefer 
not to think about (see Latour, 1993, p. 100). 
 
However, post-materialist  values and the increased knowledge about the humans’ relatedness to 
other species do not always moderate speciesist attitudes. As Singer remarks, ‘the moral 
attitudes of the past are too deeply embedded in our thought and our practices to be upset by a 
mere change in our knowledge of ourselves and other animals’ (1990:  212).  Indeed, while  
scientific  research is   usually disdainful  of anthropomorphic attributions to animals, it requires  
a form of ‘reverse anthropomorph- ism’ in generalizing results of studies conducted on animals to 
humans (Rollin, 2000). Thus, while speciesism is traditional and long-standing, it is also the height 
of modernity. 
Given the influence of speciesism and of post-materialist values on the construction of the 
human–animal boundary, the present study aimed to examine how ideological dilemmas 
surrounding this boundary might be resolved in countries at very different points on the post-
materialist spectrum. We predicted that both materialist and post- materialist values would 
support speciesism and that individuals from both materialist and post-materialist societies may 
be able to claim that their cultures’ speciesism is inevitable but for different reasons. 
 
The present study 
 
To understand better the variation in the construction of the human–animal boundary, the  present 
study proceeded by  prompting  dilemmas  about life-and-death   issues involving humans and 
animals among focus group participants in Britain and Romania. As Billig et al. (1988) have 
suggested, contrary themes are necessarily invoked when people argue and discuss everyday 
issues. We predicted that ‘animal nature’ would be a dilemmatic construction in these focus 
groups because people usually use animal- derived products for their daily lives, but can 
experience sympathy and pity for animals’ plight and include some animals in their homes  as 
pets. 
 
In Inglehart’s terms, Britain is a post-materialist  country while Romania is not, as Britain is one 
of the richest countries in Europe whereas Romania is one of the poorest. Britain  has a long history 
of animal rights activism, whereas animal welfare organizations were founded in Romania only in 
the late 1990s. While vegetarianism is quite common in Britain and has a long history, in 
Romania the Romanian Vegetarian Society was founded only in 1991. In Britain, vegetarianism 
is linked to animal issues, whereas in Romania it is linked more to health issues. We expected 
that, given the wider spread of post-materialist  values in Britain than in Romania, the British 
participants would be more likely to extend the scope of justice to animals, and that different 
justifications of speciesism would arise in the two cultural groups. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-one Romanians and 21 British people participated. Nineteen female and two male 
Romanian participants were students at a high school in Bucharest (age range ¼ 17 – 19 years, M ¼ 
17:80 years). Ten male and 11 female British participants were recruited via posters on a university  
campus (ages range ¼ 18 – 42 years, M ¼ 24:80 years). 
 
 
Focus group interviews 
 
  
Informed by current issues within  each country, six questions pertaining to animal and human 
life were drawn up for each country. The questions about human life were the same across the 
two national groups and pertained to euthanasia, abortion and the separation of conjoint twins 
with  unequal chances of survival. A question about animal experimentation was used for  both 
national groups. The Romanian sample answered two other questions about the euthanasia of 
stray dogs in Bucharest (the Romanian capital) and the reduction of unnecessary suffering during 
the killing of animals at abattoirs. The British participants answered two questions about fox 
hunting and the culling of uninfected animals during the foot-and-mouth epidemic in 2001 (see 
Appendix for  the complete interview  schedule). The questions about animals differed in the 
two countries in order to reflect the animal issues specific to each country. Thus, although the 
questions were not identical, they were functionally equivalent  as   it  is  often  the  case with   
cross-cultural research (see Lyons & Chryssochoou, 2000). 
 
 
Procedure 
 
The Romanian participants were recruited at a  high school in Bucharest, and the British 
participants were recruited on a British university campus.  Each focus group was composed of 
seven participants, and the discussions  were moderated by the first author. The participants 
were debriefed at the end of the each focus group discussion. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis was carried out by the first author. The Romanian focus group interviews were 
translated into English. Our analysis was informed by thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004). Our themes were theory driven as they sought to reflect instances of speciesism 
and influences of post-materialism.  Each transcript was read carefully and patterns in the data 
were noted. Data were categorized into codes, related codes were spliced and themes were formed. 
Overall, four main themes emerged from both the British and the Romanian data, some of them 
reflecting similarities, and others, differences. 
 
As the research aimed to examine the meanings people attach to animal and human existence 
within different political and socio-economic contexts, we were principally interested in the 
construction of the categories of ‘humans’ and ‘animals’ in talk. Our approach shared many 
assumptions with  discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and discourse  analysis 
(Potter &  Wetherell, 1987); we  assumed  that such constructions were unconstrained by any 
external reality (Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 
1995), but understood the construction of such categories  as forms of social action (Wetherell, 
1998) and we were oriented towards inconsistencies in the construction of such categories. 
 
Results 
 
Rational autonomy 
 
Humans’ rational   autonomy   was  often  spontaneously invoked  by  participants attempting 
to demarcate animals from humans. Humans were explicitly described as those who ‘have 
reason, which  distinguishes them from animals’ (Romanian  focus group (RFG) 1, 170) but 
categorical distinctions were readily challenged, in which the dilemma was often resolved by 
resorting to incontestable ideologies such as religious dogma: 
 
154   A: ‘Humans are thinking creatures.’ 
  
155   B: ‘How do you know animals are not?’ 
156   A: ‘They communicate, too, but not like humans’. 
157   C: ‘Humans are superior creatures  as God put them at the centre of his 
158   creation, the centre of animals, of nature, everything’. 
159   B: ‘But that doesn’t mean that humans should take advantage : : : ’ (RFG 3, 154–159). 
 
 
As it can be noted, participant C intervened to resolve the apparent dilemma but religion was 
not incontrovertible; participant B contested it. In discourse analysis, this form of argument is 
referred to as  a  ‘bottom-line argument’, i.e. one that invokes something that often works as a 
‘fundamental’ and that cannot be challenged or is difficult to challenge. 
 
As regarded the existence of reason in animals, one participant was doubtful about the animals’ 
mental abilities,  as can be seen in this dialogue about animal testing: 
 
46   D: ‘But don’t you think that’s pretty hypocritical because the animals’ 
47   parents, for example, might get really sad when the baby animal dies.’ 
48   E: ‘Yeah, I think you’ve to look at it : : : if they actually do or not, because 
49   animals don’t have the same kind of : : : like, you know, frontal cortex, 
50   emotional attachment  as humans do, like self-awareness issues, so they 
51   may feel the loss, I guess, but in a different way, but it becomes quite 
52   philosophical, doesn’t it? Does the way that we have attachment with 
53   ourselves : : : we put that above the way animals have attachments to each 
54   other, which we as humans  tend to do’. (British focus group (BFG) 1, 46–54). 
 
Thus, humans acknowledge that animals feel pain, but deny that animals are intelligent or self-
aware, and this denial of mentation in animals is arguably  a strategy  to reduce conflict over the 
use of animals,  as Plous (2003) suggests. 
 
Rational autonomy was used also to make distinctions among humans, and those who lacked this 
capacity were sometimes explicitly constructed as lacking  human  essence: 
 
‘When people get Alzheimer’s, ( : : : ) they are basically stripped of them being a human being’ (BFG 1, 37–
38). 
 
Thus, contrary to Regan (1997), these participants attended to variability in humans’ rational 
autonomy and used it as a basis to selectively allocate humanity. This often justified the withholding 
of human  rights,  such as the right to life of disabled unborn children: 
 
‘You cannot know if that child will have a conscience or just be a vegetable’ (RFG 3, 291–292). 
 
or disabled children who were already born: 
 
‘There’s  no use in that [disabled] child being in a  wheelchair, being on a  respirator, ventilator’ (BFG 2, 
523–525). 
 
and the right of terminally ill patients to decide when to die: 
 
‘The patient may be considered  as not being in his full mental faculties’ (RFG 1, 405). 
 
As this last extract shows, it was not the case that humans who lacked rational autonomy were 
constructed as necessarily  unworthy of life but as lacking the ability to make rational 
decisions about the beginning or continuation of their own lives. However, the withholding of 
rights to choose life or death presumes that the speakers themselves possess  rational  autonomy 
and so can adjudicate such matters  for  others  and presumably themselves. Thus, rational 
autonomy  provides  a basis for both demarcating humans from animals and for demarcating 
humans who can and cannot speak for themselves on matters of life and death. 
 
This awareness of humans’ own distinct rational autonomy  was also used to argue against cruel 
treatment of animals which do not have a voice: 
 
‘I just think that animals don’t have a choice. We choose whether they’re gonna live or die, which is really bad’ 
  
(BFG 3, 81–82). 
 
‘But the pig is still a  being, it’s  got life, and : : : I don’t know, human rights are more important but only 
because humans have reason, which distinguishes them from animals, but nevertheless, because of this, does it 
mean we shouldn’t offer them any : : : facilities, so to speak?’ (RFG 1, 169–172). 
 
As these quotations indicate, some participants implied  that  humans should be responsible 
towards animals precisely because they have more agency than them, and it could be argued that 
these participants expressed group-based  guilt  for  humans’ mistreatment of animals.  Just as in 
research on intergroup relations (e.g. Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003), the Romanian participant in 
the extract above arguably experienced group-based guilt and the dilemma of privilege because 
she perceived her in-group, the humans, to be unfairly advantaged in comparison to animals by 
being naturally endowed with reason and autonomy. 
 
Sentience 
 
While rational autonomy made humans distinct from animals, sentience was often invoked as the 
basis of similarity between humans and animals: 
 
‘[Animals] are instinctual but have feelings nonetheless. At the end of the day, our feelings are instinctual, too. 
It’s a feature  that makes us resemble animals’ (RFG 2, 246–248). 
 
Sentience  served  as a rhetorical basis for treating animals with respect in discussions about 
animal experimentation in Britain: 
 
‘You can take that to a more basic level, as well, and argue about the discomfort and pain the animal might feel 
by being tested on. That no living creature has the right to undergo that treatment’ (BFG 1, 60–62). 
 
Thus, while the participants denied moral status and decision making to animals and humans 
lacking in rational autonomy, they nonetheless agreed that animals had moral standing on the basis 
of sentience. However, sentience was not a ‘bottom-line’ argument against the exploitation of 
animals for human ends. The type of animal seemed to matter. Regarding animal experimentation 
for example, one participant justified it on the basis of her dislike of rats: 
 
‘It’s on rats that they [experiment], and I agree, I really don’t like rats’ (RFG 1, 244–245). 
 
One could argue that portraying animals as  unpleasant acted as  a  form of moral 
disengagement. Just as in-groups may be included in the scope of justice more than out- groups, 
intimate animals (i.e. pets) were protected more than animal strangers from animal cruelty (see 
Opotow, 1993): 
 
‘There’s no way you’re gonna test on my dog cause to me there’s that emotional attachment [ : : : ] If I was 
emotionally attached to an animal I would be against [animal testing], but just thinking, oh, yeah, some 
monkey out there I don’t know anything about, I would think that’s ok’ (BFG 1, 163–164, 177–179). 
 
Participants’ invocations of sentience allow a different vantage point from which to view 
theories of dehumanization that presume that humans think animals possess only primary 
emotions and that this limited emotional range justifies their exploitation. Although primary 
emotions were attributed to animals, these were used to ground sentience-based arguments 
against animal cruelty, as when this participant discussed fox hunting in the UK: 
 
‘The animal’s parents, for example, might get really sad when the baby animal dies’ (BFG 1, 46–47). 
 
Similarly, humans who were attributed a lack of humanizing rational autonomy were described  
as feeling primary emotions, e.g. happiness. However, this was a basis  for positive descriptions 
of such persons and their interests: 
 
‘This malformation [Down syndrome] doesn’t prevent those children from being happy. They may be even 
happier than us in their own world’ (RFG 2, 377–378). 
 
  
Speciesism 
 
Note that in none of the cases quoted so far have participants evoked the idea that humanity 
might be a lesser  form of life than animal life or be less entitled to decide matters of life and 
death for members of their own and other species. In the focus group discussions, speciesism was 
characterized by mutually supporting claims that humans were ontologically superior to animals 
and that humans’ interests took precedence over animals’ interests. These claims could even be 
invoked to describe animal exploitation as unavoidable  or even noble in some cases, e.g. animal 
testing: 
‘I think that you have to test on something. There are certain things that you cannot test on humans’ (BFG 2, 21–
22). 
 
‘I agree with these experiments because this way lives can be saved, humans are prevented from getting ill, 
there are certain noble causes, so to speak’ (RFG 2, 224–225). 
 
To support speciesist ideologies, participants cited the authority of religion, philosophy or tradition: 
 
‘The issues of philosophy say that humans are the ultimate goal, and therefore we humans can use any means to 
reach our ends’ (RFG 2, 211–212). 
 
‘It does make sense to test things on animals before humans if you believe that a human life is worth more than 
an animal life, which I happen to’ (BFG 2, 29–31). 
 
‘Humans  have always regarded animals as a means : : : through which they can reach their goals. Humans 
have always been superior, animals have been given to them to help them’ (RFG 2, 218–220). 
 
‘Humans are superior creatures as God put them at the centre of his creation, the centre of animals, of nature, 
everything’ (RFG 3, 160–161). 
 
On the one hand, these citations of ‘the issues of philosophy’, the intentions of a God and the 
superiority of human beings evidence the plethora of ideological justifications that humans can 
use to defend speciesism. On the other, the citations  suggest the vulnerability of speciesism  to 
attack in that they acknowledge for the necessity to defend speciesism. Indeed, some 
participants contested the validity of speciesism quite explicitly in their talk: 
 
‘I would prefer to see convicted criminals having been tested on rather than animals. But then you get into the whole 
human rights. But, you know, humans just know they’re supreme beings, so they think they’ve got the right to 
use whatever they want’ (BFG 3, 51–57). 
 
Speciesist talk is dilemmatic and here the participants expressed contradictions that make up 
common sense ideologies about human–animal similarity. Human rights appear at first 
incontrovertible and then as the consequence of human arrogance. Of course, two categories of 
‘human’ are at play here; the ‘human rights’ which might save the prisoner from experimentation 
and the humans who ‘know they’re supreme beings’ and who might adjudicate whether this 
prisoner or the prisoner’s animal counterparts are to be the subjects of experimentation. 
However, in  spite of their  evident difficulty, participants often constructed a  possible rational 
answer to the dilemmas between fulfilling human interests and avoiding animal cruelty that could 
be reached by ‘weighing up’ the evidence on each side, as in the case of animal experiments, for 
example: 
 
222   E: It has been shown in time that it is a pretty efficient option, even if it would 
223   appear slightly cruel or brutal or : : : I think that most would agree with an 
224   experiment on an animal rather than on a human. And besides, these experiments 
225   should take places, indeed, for progress and scientific discoveries and : : : But, in 
226   the end, if we were to think about animal suffering, this wouldn’t be too correct 
227    and it’s not normal : : :  
228   G: But what could we do? Experiment on plants? Ultimately it is the only 
229    solution : : :  
230   F: And at the end of the day, the best guinea pig is the rat (sic), it breeds 
231    extremely quickly and can have many offsprings : : :  
  
232   G: Yes, but not only rats, there are many carried out on monkeys,  especially  as 
233   regards the brain : : : I mean, because they are very similar to humans, and some of 
234   them [experiments] are very cruel. 
235    E: Yes, but it is less costly to do it on rats than on monkeys : : :  
236   G: Yes, but with rats you can’t do experiments researching the human brain. Or 
237   something indeed vital for humans. 
238   H: But cancer exists in animals, too. And for cancer, it’s on rats that they 
239    do : : : And I agree, I really don’t like rats : : :  
240   I: I don’t agree with these two, they are arguing about the type of animal, this 
241   issue is not relevant, it doesn’t matter on which animal you do the experiments, it 
242   matters that it is an animal, this is essentially the problem. (RFG 1, 222–242). 
 
Here, we see participants weighing up the material as well as the moral costs and benefits of 
animal testing and we find that one efficient strategy to justify the inevitable cruelty of animal 
testing is to portray animals  as pests.  Note the complexity of the argument and how  certain 
lines of reasoning are introduced and then effectively resisted. There seems to be a form of 
utilitarianism underlying these exchanges, which appears to be a standard and accepted basis for 
weighing moral dilemmas. However, not all participants endorsed the view that animals should be 
sacrificed for the benefit of humans. The same dilemma regarding animal experimentation was 
echoed by the British participants: 
 
‘If we didn’t use animals to test on, how would we find new cures for medicine and stuff? What is the other 
option?  So there’s a lot of benefits and there’s a lot of disadvantages, but you’ve just got to weigh up the two. I 
think there’s a lot of abuse and exploitation and stuff going on : : : ’ (BFG 2, 55–58). 
 
But as can be seen in the following exchange, the participants perceived the dilemmas associated 
with speciesism and with humans’ power over animals: 
 
110   J: ‘I agree. We are superior beings and we have to test medicine on somebody 
111   else to see if they are good’. 
112   K: ‘And if aliens come and kidnap you and do experiments on you to test 
113   whatever they need in order to evolve, would that seem logical to you because 
114   they are superior?’ 
115   L: ‘Do you want, as a human,  if you believe in medicine, shouldn’t you test them 
116   on yourself,  as a human?’ 
117   M: ‘It would be best that those who discover  a medicine test it on themselves. 
118   We’ve got a responsibility,  we can’t test on animals because it would 
119   mean : : : .Because it doesn’t say anywhere that humans are superior and that they 
120   should use animals and test on them and evolve because of them : : : Because those 
121   animals are creatures, too, and have the same right as us to populate the earth, 
122   right?’ (RFG 3, 110–122). 
 
Here, the participants questioned the authority of speciesism, with  phrases such as 
‘it  doesn’t say anywhere that humans should use animals’ and ‘if  aliens do experiments  on  
you,  would   that  seem   logical?’,  showing   the  lack  of   any fundamental ideology to 
which humans can appeal to justify their speciesist beliefs and behaviour and thus highlighting 
the inherently dilemmatic nature of speciesism. At the same time, phrases  such as  ‘we’ve got 
a  responsibility, we can’t test on animals’ could  be interpreted  as  expressions of  group-
based  guilt,  which  arises when  members  of  an  advantaged group  acknowledge their  
responsibility  and mistreatment of a  disadvantaged   out-group (see Branscombe,  Doosje, &  
McGarty, 2002), especially when the in-group’s  advantage  seems unfair and beyond the in- 
group’s control. Interestingly, the reference to aliens  as superior creatures that could do to 
humans what humans do to animals shows that there exist other binaries, such as human–alien,  
that can shape the construction of humanness  as well as the perception of the power balance 
between species (see Haslam, 2006). 
 
Speciesism has been described  as the putting of humans’ interests before those of animals. Yet, 
attaching a lower value to animals’ interests does not imply that those interests have no value 
whatsoever. Even where the priority of humans’ interest was most boldly asserted, awareness 
of animals’ interests was evident in views that it is normative, rather than logical, to prioritize 
  
humans’ interests: 
 
‘You first have to think about human not animal rights’ (RFG 1, 186–187). 
 
or that an animal’s death was a lesser wrong than a human’s death: 
 
‘There’s one thing for a laboratory  mouse to die, another, for a human  to die’ (RFG 3, 147). 
 
and in the recognition that animal research required justification: 
 
‘I think if there is any possibility of medical gain, then I think animal testing is justified’ (BFG 
3, 41–42). 
 
Thus, British participants acknowledged the horror of culling animals to prevent the spread of foot-and-
mouth disease in 2001 even when they did not disagree with such culling: 
 
‘Even though it was awful : : : the way it was handled was wrong. I think it had to be done because it was better 
to save us and a lot of people’ (BFG 2, 264–265). 
 
Finally, participants often tempered their utilitarianism by calling attention to examples of animal 
research that were not necessary  for humans’ welfare and which  were unjustified. Here, 
participants often drew a distinction between medical research and cosmetics research, with the 
former being justified in terms of necessity and worth: 
 
‘To conciliate both animals and humans, it is necessary to do certain experiments but only if strictly necessary, 
not for luxury or other purposes’ (RFG 1, 276–277). 
 
‘I don’t agree with cosmetics, that’s more of a vanity thing, but if it’s for medicine, it’s for a worthy cause’ 
(BFG 1, 8–10). 
 
Maintaining materialist and post-materialist values 
 
Thus far, we have described similarities in the Romanian and British data. In this final section, 
we attend to the differences in the ways that the participants in each country appealed to their own 
country’s particular economic situation to justify the exploitation of animals. The Romanian 
participants were aware  of the link  between material development  and social values and 
tended to agree that animals were better treated in Western European countries. However, in their 
own country, improvements in human rights took precedence over improvements in animal rights: 
 
‘I think that in the end somewhat the facilitation of human rights ultimately determines  a better life for 
animals, too. But the causal chain, so to speak, starts with humans: if humans have more rights and manage their 
money better, then with time there will be solutions for animals, too’ (RFG 1, 198–201). 
 
In this trickle-down theory, improving the rights of humans leads to improvements in the rights 
of animals. At other points, Romanian participants argued that improving animal rights at home 
would increase the chances of European Union membership, as in the case of the culling of stray 
dogs: 
 
‘In my opinion, they should put [dogs] in a dog shelter, it is true, many financial resources are needed for such a 
thing, but, for us to get into the European Union, I think this is the best measure, not killing them’ (RFG 1, 25–
27). 
 
Against these modernizing Westernizing agendas, concepts  like ‘tradition’ and ‘national identity’ 
were invoked to justify the status quo in Romania, including the killing of animals. One 
participant focused on the Romanian tradition of knifing pigs before Christmas: 
 
‘This is a matter of tradition as well, because in our country pigs have always been cut in the traditional way’ 
(RFG 1, 153–154). 
Again, rational autonomy, in the form of decision making, was introduced to justify the 
maintenance of traditional forms of animal cruelty: 
 
‘In time, we become civilised, but, still, certain traditions should be kept. And if humans, be they Romanian, 
  
Swiss, Belgian, want the pig to be cut or injected, they should be able to decide this’ (RFG 2, 140–142). 
There were echoes of Bhiku Parekh’s insightful observation that ‘although we can draw up a list of 
universal moral values, not all societies have the required moral, cultural, economic and other 
resources to live up to their demands’ (2000: 133). Caught between the dilemma of tradition and 
Westernization,  some Romanian participants concluded that Romania would modernize, but 
slowly: 
‘For the third millennium, it’s clear that this is what should be happening in order for us to evolve. But, as regards  
their application, I don’t think that this will  be possible, in our country, for a long time’ (RFG 1, 207–210). 
These accounts of the difficulties of securing animal rights might lead one to suspect that British 
participants would endorse  them more obviously than Romanians  did. Phrases like organic, 
vegetarian and against animal  testing were part of the British discourse but not the Romanian 
one. In the course of the focus groups, one British participant  declared herself to  be a  
vegetarian and others  advocated cruelty-free cosmetics and organic products. Participants often 
voiced the opinion that such post- materialist values ordinarily shaped consumer behaviour: 
 
‘There’ll be a lot of people who are concerned about animals rights and don’t want to use products tested on 
animals ‘cause they don’t feel personally : : : .whatever, they’ve decided they don’t want to. So they look at the 
product and it says “against  animal testing” or “this product is not tested”’ (BFG 3, 140–143). 
In contrast to the Romanian participants, who saw ethical treatment of animals as evidence of 
modernization, the British understood such practices as a return to tradition: 
 
‘If they went back to traditional,  natural, even organic farming methods, you have to respect the land, they’d 
have the space to go around, they wouldn’t need all these injections to prevent the illnesses’ (BFG 1, 384–
387). 
Ironically, the British invoked tradition not to justify the exploitation of animals, like the 
Romanians did, but to propose less cruel alternatives to farming. 
 
Not only modernity and tradition but also poverty and wealth were used in each country to 
justify the status quo. In Romania, the participants used existential insecurity to legitimize the 
exploitation of animals: 
 
‘Shelters [for dogs] don’t seem to me a good solution in our country because we are a poor country, we hardly 
feed ourselves, let alone dogs’ (RFG 2, 40–41). 
 
‘And nobody says that you should be purely brutal in the act of getting food, because ultimately that’s what 
it is, but in our country there are more important problems that require greater attention than this’ (RFG 1, 
133–135). 
 
‘I don’t know if this [the euthanasia of dogs] is a very good measure, but I know for sure that it is in line with 
our resources’ (RFG 2, 32–33). 
 
For the British participants, consumption appeared to  be the unstoppable force that limited 
changes in animal welfare: 
 
‘There is a greater demand for cheaper food and all the economy brands, and the effect it’s had on farmers, quite 
badly, they kind of tried to take shortcuts, like when they feed the animals their own brains and stuff, which led 
to BSE’ (BFG 1, 377–380). 
 
‘Do you think we’re actually to blame as consumers,  partially, for these epidemic patterns? We’re constantly 
saying we want food cheaper and the people who are gonna make it cheaper are the farmers, and they’re gonna 
cut corners and this is why I think things like these may be happening’ (BFG 3, 320–323). 
 
This is not to say that the British participants endorsed consumption patterns that limited 
animals’ welfare, only that they constructed them as barriers to changing the status quo: 
 
‘The whole sort of foot and mouth incident and everything like that just highlights the complete lack of 
respect that business seems to have for nature nowadays. Everybody is taking the short-term viewpoint of 
business, it’s just the viewpoint of you making your profits for the end of year results’ (BFG 1, 391–395). 
  
 
Discussion 
 
What are these British and Romanian participants telling social psychologists about how we 
should configure the human–animal boundary in our theories of intergroup relations? First, they 
show the contested nature of both that boundary itself and its relationship to exploitation. 
Rational autonomy makes (most) humans unlike (most) animals but sentience  makes us all 
appear to be much more alike and almost equal in the rights we should enjoy. In line with  
Billig et al’s  (1988)perspective, these essential differences and similarities fall out from, and are 
not epistemologically prior to,  ideological concerns. Second, as   in  other  domains of  liberal  
ideology, our participants were caught on the horns of a dilemma  between believing in their 
own groups’ superiority and more important interests and in believing that cruelty against other 
living things was wrong. While theories of dehumanization tended to assume that animals 
provide a good blueprint for ill-treated out-groups  because animals have fundamentally different 
natures from humans, these data show how humans’ shared consensus about human–animal 
differences can lead them to infer that they should treat animals well. As one participant put it, 
‘humans rights are more important [] because humans have reason, which distinguishes them 
from animals, but nevertheless [] does it mean we shouldn’t offer them [animals] any : : : 
facilities, so to  speak?’  (RFG 1, 169–171). Like good modern subjects, these participants are 
aware that human and animal nature are caught up in a complex relationship with each other, 
but still imagine that humans and animals are fundamentally different (Latour, 1993). 
 
It could be argued here that speciesism served to justify the system (cf. Jost & Banaji, 1994) 
because it  provided  the  participants with  an ideology that  could rationalize the existing 
power relations between humans and animals. At the same time, speciesism  provided the 
participants with  readily available solutions to  the dilemmas that they encountered when 
thinking about animal exploitation for human needs. While both British and Romanian 
participants endorsed speciesist views and used them to  justify the exploitation  of animals 
and to  draw the human–animal boundary, they used their  societies’ differing economic 
conditions in  very similar ways  to  suggest the  impossibility  of  improving  animal  welfare.  
Complicating Inglehart’s  theory, both  characteristics  of  materialist and post-materialist  
societies provided means of justifying the status quo. At the individual level, both poverty and 
rampant consumerism  seemed to force humans to make choices  that would harm animals, 
while at the societal level, they both engendered  life-styles and cycles of consumption 
detrimental to animal welfare. It would thus appear that post- materialist  values cannot totally  
override deeply embedded and all-pervasive speciesist  attitudes, maybe because,   as Garner 
(2003) argues,  the moral pluralism of liberal ideology conceives animal rights as  a  moral 
preference rather than as  a moral obligation. 
If the human–animal boundary is dilemmatic, then what are the implications for the  
operationalization of  the  concept  of  dehumanization? Categories   such  as 
‘human’ and ‘animal’ seem to be more fluid than the ideologies that shape them or the social  
inequalities that these ideologies protect. First,  the dilemmatic construction  of  the  
categories  ‘animal’  and ‘human’  along such dimensions as rational autonomy and sentience 
suggests not only that these should be viewed as ends of a  humanity continuum (cf. Demoulin 
et al., 2004) but also that one continuum may be not enough. Also, even if emotions and traits 
are placed on a humanity continuum, their places on this continuum may not always be the 
same, but may vary function of context or rhetorical purposes. Arguably, the dimensions of 
sentience and rational autonomy correspond broadly to  Haslam et al.’s  (2005) human  nature  
and uniquely  human  dimensions that  constitute humanness.  It could be argued that while  
rational autonomy is rhetorically used as  the crucial difference between humans and animals, 
  
sentience may be used as  the essential difference between humans and machines (cf.  Haslam, 
2006), and it  would  be interesting to examine further how human–machine or human–alien 
boundaries are constructed in discourse. 
 
Second, these participants are asking us if the dehumanization of out-groups might not  be  
dilemmatic too.  The  dehumanization of  out-groups may be  an ad hoc phenomenon that 
varies  as a function of the in-group’s interests. One could argue that just as animals can 
experience both dehumanization and anthropomorphization, so the dehumanization of out-groups 
may be a  spontaneous   and localized phenomenon, justifying particular ideologies or serving 
certain purposes, something that research on dehumanization might want to explore. If it is 
shown that dehumanization is context dependent, this might be explained in terms of system 
justification, for it could be argued that just like speciesism, dehumanization may not linked to the 
perception of the out-group’s attributes per se, but to the in-group’s interests of power and 
domination. Given that the most excluded animals from the scope of justice were the pests, it is 
possible that dehumanized groups are perceived as posing  threat  to the in-group and be seen as 
vermin to society, and future research on dehumanization might want to explore the link between 
perceived threat and dehumanization. At the same time, given the ideological aspects of 
speciesism, it could also be argued that dehumanization, too, serves to justify the system and to 
legitimize the social exclusion of certain groups, such as the Gypsies. In this sense, 
dehumanization  might be a post hoc phenomenon and a form  of moral exclusion or  
delegitimization, in  line  with  Opotow’s  and Bar-Tal’s theorization. 
 
To conclude, the present study offers insights into the psychological  processes that accompany 
the drawing of  the human–animal  boundary and the construction of humanness itself. By 
showing its dilemmatic aspects, the present study challenges the essentialization of the categories 
human and animal and draws attention to the post hoc nature of these two categories. The 
dilemmas surrounding the human–animal boundary were resolved by resorting to resources such as 
speciesist views, tradition, religion, lack of post-materialist  values, existential insecurity or 
consumerism.  Speciesism generally excluded animals from the scope of justice by making 
humans argue that animals are essentially inferior to humans and that their role on earth is to 
serve humans’ needs. At the same time, this study suggests that dehumanization may be 
dilemmatic, too, and that the dehumanization paradigm should also take into account the 
psychological processes associated with the attribution of humanity to dehumanized groups. 
Thus, while Gypsies may be considered too ‘primitive’  to suffer real psychological trauma, they 
are no longer primitive when their music is needed to entertain the non-Gypsy majority. 
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Appendix 
 
 
The questions for the Romanian participants 
 
(1) Two years ago the mayor of Bucharest suggested that stray dogs claimed by no one should be 
euthanised. I would like you to comment. 
(2) At the beginning of the year 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food issued the order 425 
which stipulated that animals taken to the abattoir should not be subjected to any unnecessary 
suffering or pain during the killing. What do you think? 
(3)  Some people consider animal experiments necessary for scientific progress. I would like your 
opinion on this. 
(4)  Sometimes two conjoint twins are born with complications, and only one of them has survival 
chances. When the operation of separation takes place, it is known that the other twin is going 
to die. What do you think? 
(5)  Euthanasia has been suggested as a means  of ending the suffering of terminally ill patients 
who are dependent on life-support machines. What do you think? 
(6)  Foetuses that will be born with malformations or genetic diseases are usually aborted. 
 I would like your opinion on this. 
 
 
The questions for the British participants 
 
(1) It has been argued that animal testing should not be allowed. I would like your opinion on 
this. 
(2) Do you think fox hunting should be banned or not? 
(3) During  the  foot-and-mouth epidemic many uninfected animals were  culled. 
What do you think? 
(4) Sometimes  when two  conjoint twins are born only one of them has survival chances. 
When the operation to separate them is carried out it is known in advance that one of 
them will die. What do you think? 
(5) Foetuses revealed to  have malformations of  various  genetic disorders  are sometimes 
aborted. I would like your opinion on this. 
(6) Euthanasia  has been suggested  as a way of ending the suffering of terminally ill patients. 
How do you feel about this? 
